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Indispensability Argument and Set Theory
The Quinean indispensability  argument,  as  put 
by Mark Colyvan (2001: The Indispensability of  
Mathematics, Oxford University Press, 192 pp., 
p.1): "... mathematical entities are indispensable 
to our best physical theories and therefore share 
the ontological status of scientific entities."
Of  course,  one  may  take  several  different 
positions with respect to the ontological status of 
scientific  entities  such as,  for  example,  quarks 
(quarks can't be observed even in principle). Do 
quarks  "really  exist",  or  are  they  only  a 
(currently successful) theoretical construct used 
by physicists in their models? Perhaps, the "least 
committed" position could be the formalist one: 
let  us  define  the  "real  existence"  of  some 
scientific  entity  as  its  invariance  in  future 
scientific theories. If quarks will be retained as a 
construct  in  our  best  future  physical  theories, 
then  one  may  think  of  quarks  as  "really 
existing".  Even  from  such  a  very  formalistic 
point of view, the Quinean argument seems quite 
reasonable. Indeed, if some mathematical entity 
is  indispensable  to  our  best  physical  theories, 
then shouldn't we believe, that this entity "exists" 
in the same sense as quarks are believed to exist?
However, imagine two mathematical entities E1 
and E2, such that the existence of E1 contradicts 
the existence of E2. Can both of such entities be 
indispensable to our best physical  theories? As 
an  example,  let  us  consider  two  well-known 
versions of set theory:
ZFC, i.e. ZF+AC, where ZF stands for Zermelo-
Fraenkel  axioms,  and  AC  is  the  Axiom  of 
Choice,  see  Thomas  Jech (2006: Set  Theory, 
Springer, 772 pp., Chapter 1);
ZF+AD,  where  AD is  the  so-called  Axiom of 
Determinacy, see Akihiro Kanamori (2003: The 
Higher Infinite: Large Cardinals in Set Theory  
from  Their  Beginnings,  Springer,  564  pp., 
Chapter 6).
AD contradicts AC, hence, these theories cannot 
be  used  together.  Currently,  ZFC  is  almost 
generally acknowledged as the formal basis for 
theoretical  mathematics.  If  ZF+AD  would  be 
used  instead  of  ZFC,  then  we  would  have  a 
slightly  different  theoretical  mathematics. 
Worse,  or  better  than  the  actual  one?  Who 
knows...  But:  as  a  basis  for  the  applied 
mathematics,  ZFC  and  ZF+AD  can  be  used 
equally  well!  All  the  mathematical  inferences, 
currently necessary for physical theories, can be 
performed in ZF, i.e. in ZFC and in ZF+AD as 
well.  Then,  which  of  both  set  theories  is 
indispensable  to  our  best  physical  theories  - 
ZFC, or ZF+AD?
May one believe that  some of the proper ZFC 
inferences  (i.e.  inferences  involving  AC  that 
can't  be  performed  in  ZF  alone)  could,  some 
time  in  the  future,  be  applied  in  physical 
theories? But so could proper ZF+AD inferences 
as well!
Would  you  say now that  this  is  nothing new? 
That with the non-Euclidean geometries we have 
exactly  the  same  situation:  there  are  several 
geometries  contradicting  each  other,  but  all  of 
them  are  indispensable  to  our  best  physical 
theories?  Indeed,  the  Euclidean  geometry  and 
non-Euclidean  geometries  are  now  become 
special  cases  of  a  more  general  theory  that 
inspired Einstein's general relativity theory - the 
so-called  Riemannian  geometry,  see  Peter 
Petersen (2006: Riemannian Geometry, Springer, 
408 pp.).
And  with  set  theories  we  have  the  same 
situation! As a set theory, ZF+AD is much more 
powerful  than  ZFC.  According  to  a  theorem 
proved  by  W.  Hugh  Woodin,  ZF+AD  can  be 
"embedded" into a powerful extension of ZFC, 
obtained  by  adding  one  of  the  so-called  large 
cardinal  axioms  ("There  are  infinitely  many 
Woodin  cardinals"),  and  conversely,  this 
powerful extension of ZFC can be "embedded" 
into  ZF+AD.  See  Kanamori  (2003:  Theorem 
32.16). Should this mean, as in the case of non-
Euclidean geometries, that set theories ZFC and 
ZF+AD  are  both indispensable  to  our  best 
physical theories?
But  then,  how  about  the  most  fundamental 
mathematical entity - the famous unique "world 
of sets" to which we ought to have ontological 
commitment  and  that  must  be  studied  in  set 
theory  as  the  only  structure  worth  of 
consideration?  And  in  which  the  famous 
Continuum Hypothesis  must  be  either  true,  or 
false,  independently  of  the  ability  of  human 
mathematicians  to  decide  this?  Which  of  the 
axioms  -  AC,  or  AD  is  true  in  this  "world"? 
Most set theorists accept AC, and reject AD, i.e. 
for them, AC is true in the "world of sets", and 
AD is false. Applying to set theory the above-
mentioned  formalistic  explanation  of  the 
existence of quarks, we could say: if, for a long 
time  in  the  future,  set  theorists  will  continue 
their believing in AC, then one may think of a 
unique "world of sets" as existing in the same 
sense as quarks are believed to exist.
But,  as  we  see,  this  is  only  a  "light-weight" 
opinion  that  can't  be  justified  by  the  Quinean 
indispensability  argument!  And,  when  it  can't, 
then  "what  is  the  fuss  about?"  (as  put  by  a 
prominent logician).
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